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I. INTRODUCTION
As Dramatist John Heywood first memorialized in his 1546 work,
you cannot have your cake and eat it too.1 Whether this proverb is
relevant to an arbitration clause providing for expanded review is an
issue of sharp contention among the federal circuits. Expanded judi-
cial review is applied to arbitration agreements in the context of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), under which parties to an arbitration
agreement can choose to rely on a federal district court to review an
arbitrator's decision and either confirm or vacate the arbitral award.
2
Within this framework, at issue is whether parties to an arbitration
agreement can contract for expanded judicial review of their arbitra-
tion decision, rather than have the court apply only the statutorily
and judicially created standards.3
In Schoch v. InfoUSA,4 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, with-
out expressly deciding the issue, strongly suggested that it would not
allow expanded review of arbitrators' decisions. Nevertheless, Schoch
represents the Eight Circuit's position at the center of a circuit divide.
On one side, courts allow expanded review of arbitration decisions,
stressing the contractual nature of arbitration and the FAA policy
favoring the freedom of parties to structure their agreements as they
see fit.5 On the other side, courts disallow expanded review because
allowing it would endanger the independence and efficiency of the ar-
bitration process and, more fundamentally, because the FAA provides
the exclusive grounds for review of arbitration awards, thus preclud-
ing any expanded review.
6
1. THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS: CLASSICAL AND MODERN 1561 (Burton Steven-
son ed., 6th ed. 1952). The actual phrase from Heywood's Proverbs is "would ye
both eat your cake and have your cake?
2. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. 341 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2003).
5. See P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2005);
Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001);
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995).
6. See Kyocera Corp v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003);
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
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This Note will address the circuit split over expanded review, and
the reasons why the Eighth Circuit should decide in favor of expanded
review. Sections II.A and B establish the necessary foundation for dis-
cussing the split over expanded review. Section II.A is a brief discus-
sion of the history of the FAA and the Supreme Court's treatment of it,
while Section II.B discusses the statutory grounds of review provided
in the FAA and the judicially created grounds of review. Then, Sec-
tion II.C discusses the case law allowing and disallowing expanded
review, concluding with a description of Schoch. Section III.A ex-
plains why Supreme Court interpretation of the FAA, and its empha-
sis on freedom of contract, overrides any concerns about the effects of
expanded review on arbitral efficiency or on the dynamics of the arbi-
tration process. Section III.B argues that the "clear and unmistaka-
ble" requirement suggested in Schoch sufficiently balances FAA
concerns over judicial interference with the policy favoring enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements by their terms. Section III.C argues:
that practical limitations sufficiently bind parties seeking expanded
review to structure their arbitration agreements accordingly, so as not
to unduly interfere with the functioning of a reviewing court; that the
Eighth Circuit's suggestion that the FAA standards are the exclusive
means for review of an arbitration decision is undercut by the appel-
late courts' own acknowledgement of judicially created standards; and
finally, that the creation of federal jurisdiction by contract is not a
consequence of allowing expanded review.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The FAA-Legislative Intent and Supreme Court
Interpretation
1. The FAA and Legislative Intent
In 1925, Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act (codi-
fied in 1947 as the Federal Arbitration Act) with the purpose of
"mak[ing] valid and enforcible agreements for arbitration contained in
contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or
admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
courts."7 The root necessity for the FAA's promulgation can be traced
back centuries to English courts' adamant refusal to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements, which the courts viewed as stripping them of juris-
diction.8 American courts inherited this longstanding "jealousy," and
7. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
8. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2. See also U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1007 (D.C.N.Y. 1915) ("It has never been denied
that the hostility of English-speaking courts to arbitration contracts probably
originated 'in the contests of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdic-
tion-all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every
2007]
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by 1925 Congress felt that this jealousy was so embedded in jurispru-
dence that a legislative enactment was necessary to ensure the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. 9
2. Supreme Court Interpretation
Supreme Court analysis and interpretation of the FAA over the
last forty years demonstrates a principal theme of enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements by their terms.10 Three cases frequently cited when
discussing expanded review, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,"l
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University,12 and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.,13 are demonstrative of the Supreme Court's overarching
disposition.
Settling a circuit split, the Dean Witter Court concluded that the
FAA requires district courts to compel arbitration of an otherwise ar-
bitrable claim, even when doing so leads to inefficient, bifurcated pro-
ceedings, during which nonarbitrable claims are resolved in the courts
and arbitrable claims are resolved through arbitration.14 The circuits
that had previously denied arbitration of the arbitrable claims in or-
der to avoid bifurcation based their decisions to do so in part on effi-
one of them ofjurisdiction.' A more unworthy genesis cannot be imagined. Since
(at the latest) the time of Lord Kenyon, it has been customary to stand rather
upon the antiquity of the rule than upon its excellence or reason.") (quoting Scott
v. Avery, 4 H.L.Cas. 811 (1856) (Campbell, L.J.)).
9. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2. Indeed, before the FAA was adopted, many courts
either outright refused to enforce arbitration agreements or at least questioned
their enforceability. Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, Contracting
Around the FAA: The Enforceability of Private Agreements to Expand Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 151, 160 (2002).
10. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1995)
(holding that the FAA preempted a state law less favorable to arbitration, court
rested decision in part on the purpose of the FAA to overcome "judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements"); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (finding that an arbitration agreement valid and enforceable even for a
statutory age discrimination claim); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987)
(holding that when there is an enforceable agreement arbitrate, the FAA pro-
vides a "clear federal policy of requiring arbitration"); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20, 24 (1983) (finding that the FAA
"requires piecemeal resolution" if it is necessary to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment by its terms, because "Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (noting that the purpose
of the FAA is "to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts,
but not more so").
11. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
12. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
13. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
14. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 217-18.
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ciency: by avoiding bifurcation, they could steer clear of possibly
litigating the same issues twice. 15 The Supreme Court disagreed and
instead sided with the circuits that allowed bifurcation. The Court
agreed that the FAA's "plain meaning and the strong federal policy it
reflects, requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbi-
trate."'6 Acknowledging that the FAA's drafters did not explicitly con-
template the possibility of bifurcated proceedings, the Court looked to
the legislative history of the Act for guidance. From this history, the
Court concluded that the overriding goal of the FAA was to "ensure
judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate," not to
ensure the "expeditious resolution of claims."'17
In Volt, the Court held that when parties, through a choice-of-law
provision, agree that state law should apply to their arbitration agree-
ment, the FAA should not preempt the state law, even if the state law
(in contrast to the FAA) allows for a stay in arbitration while related
litigation is pending between a party to the arbitration agreement and
a third party.1 8 The Court found that allowing the parties to apply
California arbitration rules rather than those provided by the FAA did
not offend the "federal policy favoring arbitration." The Court opined:
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedu-
ral rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to
their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate. . . . Arbitration under the
[FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. 1 9
The Court again demonstrated its emphasis on enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements according to their terms in Mastrobuono.2 0 There, an
arbitrator awarded punitive damages, even though New York courts
(where the case was arbitrated) did not allow arbitrators to do so.
2 1
The Court held that if parties contracted to include any potential
claims for punitive damages among their arbitrable claims, the FAA
ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its terms,
notwithstanding a state rule to the contrary. 2 2
Although addressing different concerns, Dean Witter, Volt, and
Mastrobuono all rely on the same notion: under the FAA, the overrid-
ing concern is that agreements to arbitrate be enforced according to
their terms.
15. Id. at 217.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 219.
18. Volt, 489 U.S. at 468.
19. Id. at 476, 479.
20. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 54 (1995).
21. Id. at 54.
22. Id. at 59.
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B. Grounds for Review of an Arbitration Award
1. Statutory Grounds for Review
Although the overall purpose of the FAA was to make arbitration
decisions enforceable, most of its provisions are concerned with the
court's role in the arbitral process, typically at the "front end" or "back
end" of the arbitration. 23 The provisions that relate to the "back end"
of the arbitration process are relevant when discussing review of arbi-
tration decisions. Section 10(a), providing four limited grounds for re-
view of an arbitrator's award, reads:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon
the application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made.
2 4
Of these grounds, the first three deal only with party or arbitrator
misconduct or some other inherent flaw in the arbitration process.
Subsection (4) offers some review of the substance of an arbitration
award, but stops short of providing review of the merits of the
decision. 2 5
2. Judicially Created Grounds for Review
In addition to the grounds established in Section 10(a), most, if not
all, circuits recognize additional judicially created standards. The
most widely adopted judicially created standard is the "manifest disre-
23. Kristen M. Blankley, Be More Specific! Can Writing a Detailed Arbitration Agree-
ment Expand Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL
CIRCUIT REV. 391, 395-96 (2006).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. II 2002).
25. See Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 243-44 (1999). Younger writes
The first three of these grounds are essentially procedural in nature:
their concern is not with the content or merit of the award, but with the
means used by the arbitrators (and, in the case of Section 10(a)(1), the
parties) in reaching the award. Section 10(a)[(4)] does address the sub-
stance of the award, but in a somewhat oblique fashion. Pursuant to this
provision, courts may strike down awards where the arbitrators decide
issues not submitted to them or grant relief not authorized by the par-
ties. However, where the subject matter or remedy is deemed within the
arbitrator's authority, a reviewing court will generally not second-guess
the merits of the arbitrator's decision.
[Vol. 86:183
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gard of the law" standard,2 6 which can be traced back to dicta in the
1953 Supreme Court case, Wilko v. Swan.2 7 The mention of the "man-
ifest disregard" standard by the Supreme Court in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan28 seemed to solidify its place as a legitimate
non-statutory ground of review. The dispute in Kaplan arose over
Kaplan's investment company's failure to comply with a series of
agreements to repay the debt owed by Kaplan to a stock trading com-
pany (First Options of Chicago). 29 The issue on appeal was over the
arbitrability of the parties' agreement. When discussing the district
court's standard of review, the Court listed the statutory standards of
review from Section 10 and, citing Wilko, the "manifest disregard of
the law" standard.30
In addition to the wide acceptance of the "manifest disregard" stan-
dard, different circuits have recognized an array of standards applica-
ble to arbitration cases under the FAA. These include vacating an
award that is in "violation[ I of public policy,"3 1 "arbitrary and capri-
cious," 3 2 or "completely irrational."3 3 As discussed in Schoch, the
Eighth Circuit has adopted the "manifest disregard" standard as well
as the "completely irrational" standard, interpreting the latter to ap-
ply when an arbitration award "fails to draw its essence from the
agreement."34
26. Blankley, supra note 23, at 402.
27. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruled on other grounds). The Court wrote:
While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of
the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securi-
ties Act would "constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to
section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be
made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions, such as the present
margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbi-
trators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
28. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
29. Id. at 940.
30. Id. at 942.
31. Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001); Denver & Rio Grande
W. R. Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1997).
32. Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11th Cir. 1995) ("An award
is arbitrary and capricious only if a ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be
inferred from the facts of the case.") (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh
Circuit is the only circuit to adopt the arbitrary and capricious standard. See
LARRY E. EDMONDSON, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 39:10 (3d ed.
2003) (stating that the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard is a
"construct of the Eleventh Circuit").
33. Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2003); G.C. and K.B. Inv.,
Inc. v. Wilson 326 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003); Roadway Packages Sys., Inc.
v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2001).
34. Schoch, 341 F.3d at 788 (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus.,
Chem. & Energy Workers, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002)).
2007]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
C. Circuit Split Over Expanded Judicial Review
The issue of expanded review arises when parties desire judicial
review outside of the typical statutory or judicially created standards,
and include language in their arbitration agreement calling for more
searching review of an arbitrator's award. The circuits are split over
the propriety of allowing parties to contract for expanded review: The
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have expressly allowed ex-
panded judicial review, while the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have held that there can be no contractually expanded review. 3 5 As
mentioned above, the Eighth Circuit has not yet been forced to decide
the issue, but the court did express doubt about the propriety of al-
lowing expanded review in both UHC Management Co., Inc. v. Com-
puter Sciences Corp.3 6 and Schoch.
1. Cases Recognizing Right to Contract for Expanded Judicial
Review
The circuits recognizing the ability to contract for expanded review
premise their decisions on the freedom to contract and the FAA's over-
all purpose to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements according
to their terms.3 7 These courts have held that the FAA's grounds for
review serve only as default rules38 that are presumptively applica-
ble,39 with parties having the ability to opt for more expanded re-
view,40 but only if the intent to do so is clearly expressed in the
agreement.
4 1
In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications,
Corp. ,42 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit to
expressly accept a party's right to contract for expanded judicial re-
view. In this case, Gateway subcontracted MCI to install and main-
tain the telephone system for Virginia's correctional facilities. The
parties' subcontracting agreement contained an arbitration clause,
which provided in part that "'[t]he arbitration decision shall be final
and binding on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject
35. The Seventh Circuit has not expressly disallowed the expanded review under the
FAA, but it has strongly expressed the inability to do so. See discussion infra
Part II.C.2.
36. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
37. See Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 434 (2004).
38. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995);
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997).
39. P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2005).
40. Roadway Packages Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001).
41. P.R. Telephone, 427 F.3d at 31; Roadway, 257 F.3d at 294.
42. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
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to appeal."' 4 3 Relying on the language used in Mastrobuono and
Volt,44 the court reasoned that the FAA neither demands arbitration
under any particular set of rules nor operates without regard to the
intent of the contracting parties. Arbitration, instead, is essentially a
"creature of contract."4 5 The court concluded that "prudent or not,"
the parties agreed to expanded review, and "to interpret this phrase
short of de novo review would render the language meaningless and
would frustrate the mutual intent of the parties."46
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the rationale of Gateway, concluding that parties could con-
tract for full de novo review by a district court.4 7 The pertinent arbi-
tration provision in that case read, "'The arbitrator shall not have the
power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may
be vacated or corrected by judicial review for any such error."
' 48
In Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized the right to contract for expanded re-
view,49 and also held that a generic choice-of-law clause by itself is
insufficient to support a finding of an agreement for expanded re-
view.50 In deciding to allow expanded review, the court stated that
43. Id. at 996 (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement).
44. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
45. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996.
46. Id. at 997. After announcing its recognition of the ability of parties to contract for
expanded review, the Fifth Circuit has had several opportunities to determine
whether or not parties actually contracted for such review. See Prescott v. Nor-
thlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that hand-
written clause added to form employment contract which read "no party waives
appeal rights, if any by signing this [arbitration] agreement" strongly suggested
intent for expanded review but was not conclusive, remanded case to district
court for more fact finding); Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790,
793 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying the de novo standard of review contracted for by the
parties to arbitration agreement); Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588,
593 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that parties had chosen to supplement FAA stan-
dards with standards set out in the Employment Problem Resolution Procedures
guide).
47. Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11,
1997).
48. Id. at *6 (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement).
49. Roadway Packages Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (The
court declared, "We now join with the great weight of authority and hold that
parties may opt out of the FAA's off-the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their
own (including by referencing state law standards).").
50. Id. at 296. The contract at issue contained an arbitration clause as well as a
generic choice of law clause, but no language expressly establishing a standard of
review broader than that of the FAA. Id. The arbitration clause stated that the
parties bind themselves to resolve any disputes "'by arbitration in accordance
with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion.'" Id. at 293 (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement). The court held
"that a generic choice-of-law clause, standing alone, raises no inference that con-
tacting parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default regime." Id. at 297.
20071
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the FAA permits parties to choose the rules under which they will ar-
bitrate, and that courts are bound to enforce those agreements. 5 1 In
deciding the "truly difficult question"5 2 of whether the parties actually
did contract for expanded review, the court cited three reasons why it
determined that a generic choice-of-law clause was not alone sufficient
to warrant a finding of expanded review: first, such a rule limits the
frequency of finding an expanded standard when such was not in-
tended; second, it creates an easy rule for courts to apply; and third, it
provides a useable rule that sophisticated parties can contract around
without undue added expense.5 3 The court concluded that requiring
parties to clearly express intentions to expand judicial review was con-
sistent with the goals of the FAA, and also preserved parties' ability
"to contract around the default federal standards."54
Agreeing with the rationale forwarded in Gateway and Roadway,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the ability to contract for
expanded review in Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. U.S. Phone Manufac-
turing Corp.,55 emphasizing that the principle goal of the FAA was to
ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements by the agreements'
terms. 56 In addition, the court directly addressed two of the argu-
ments forwarded against allowing expanded review. First, the court
pointed out that the idea that expanded review would allow creation of
jurisdiction by contract was misplaced, noting the "well settled" prin-
ciple that federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over suits to confirm
or vacate arbitration awards only if there is some independent basis
for the court's jurisdiction.57 Second, the court addressed concerns
over the effect of expanded review on the efficiency of the arbitration
process, citing Dean Witter for the notion "that efficient dispute reso-
lution should not be favored over the FAA's primary goal of enforcing
private agreements to arbitrate."5 8 While emphasizing the impor-
tance of enforcing a contract according to its terms, the court also ac-
knowledged the importance of recognizing the authority of
arbitrators.59 To balance the concerns of undue infringement on the
authority of arbitrators while still recognizing parties' ability to con-
tract for expanded review, the court held that the FAA creates a pre-
sumption that the narrow statutorily prescribed FAA standards will
51. Id. at 292-93.
52. Id. at 293.
53. Id. at 296-97.
54. Id. at 297.
55. 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
56. Id. at 31.
57. Id. at 30-31. See also discussion infra Parts L.C.2, IIL.C.3.




apply, but parties can overcome this presumption and contract for ex-
panded review by clearly expressing such intent in their agreement.
60
2. Cases Disallowing Expanded Judicial Review
The courts disallowing expanded review have done so for several
reasons: First, they say expanded review would adversely affect the
efficiency of arbitration and fundamentally alter the dynamics of the
arbitral process. 6 1 Second, allowing expanded review is inimical to
the basic policy behind the FAA of preventing judicial interference
with arbitration. 62 Third, the grounds of review provided by the FAA
are the exclusive grounds for review, thus precluding the application
of additional expanded standards. 63 Fourth, expanded review would
unduly interfere with judicial independence by forcing courts to re-
view unfamiliar procedures by standards dictated by the private par-
ties.64 And finally, expanded judicial review would impermissibly
create jurisdiction by contract.
6 5
In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,66 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals became the first circuit to expressly disallow expanded review,
holding that neither the purposes behind the FAA nor Supreme Court
precedent support "allowing parties to alter the judicial process by pri-
vate contract."6 7 The case involved a dispute between Amoco and a
landowner (Bowen), who alleged that Amoco's leaking oil lines had
contaminated a stream running across his property. The parties
agreed to submit the issue to arbitration, agreeing specifically to ex-
panded review of the arbitration award "'on the grounds that the
award is not supported by the evidence.'" 6
8
The Bowen court began its analysis of the expanded review ques-
tion similarly to courts that have allowed expanded review, by first
discussing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of enforc-
ing arbitration agreements by their terms.6 9 The court, however, dis-
tinguished expanded review from situations dealt with by the
Supreme Court and expounded on several other reasons to disallow
60. Id. The court then decided that the contract at issue did not include sufficient
language to overcome this presumption. Id.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 73, 102.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
64. See infra text accompanying note 76.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
66. 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
67. Id. at 933.
68. Id. at 930 (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement). The initial arbitration
agreement between the parties was via a 1918 right-of-way agreement entered
into by predecessors in interest of both parties. Bowen and Amoco then agreed to
use the Rules for Non Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes (NABD),
modified with the expanded review clause. Id. at 928 n.1.
69. Id. at 933-34.
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expanded review.70 Distinguishing the question of expanded review
from Volt and Mastrobuono, where the issues involved only what arbi-
tral procedural rules to apply, the appellate court stated that ex-
panded review interferes with the judicial process by telling courts
what varying standards they should apply.7 1 The "key question" was
whether allowing expanded review would conflict with the policies be-
hind the FAA.72 The court cited several potential effects that could
undermine underlying FAA polices, including diluting the finality of
an arbitral decision, lessening the independence and creativity of arbi-
trators, and sacrificing the efficiency and expediency of arbitration.7
3
However, the primary problem that the court perceived was the les-
sening of arbitral independence, which would in turn endanger the
primary FAA policy of judicial respect for the arbitration process. The
court opined, "[Expanded review] threatens to undermine the policies
behind the FAA. We would reach an illogical result if we concluded
that the FAA's policy of ensuring judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements is well served by allowing for expansive judicial review
after the matter is arbitrated."74 The court reasoned that the "illogi-
cal result" of allowing expanded review is that courts could agree to
enforce an arbitration agreement only to later refuse to "respect the
results" of the arbitration process. 75 As a final cog in its analysis, the
court explained that expanded review would "place[ ] federal courts in
the awkward position of reviewing proceedings conducted under po-
tentially unfamiliar rules and procedures" and that courts are not
equipped to provide such review for arbitration proceedings.
76
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially recognized the ability
to contract for expanded review in Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp.,77 but changed its mind in an en banc decision six years later.
78
Despite the change of course, the concurrence to the initial opinion
still gets considerable attention as a middle ground approach to the
70. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
71. Id. at 933-34.
72. Id. at 935.
73. Id. at 935, 936 n.6. The court suggested that "expanded judicial review would
threaten the independence of arbitration and weaken the distinction between ar-
bitration and adjudication.... [Arbitrators are able] to fashion creative remedies
and solutions that courts may be less likely to endorse. Expanded judicial review
therefore places a court in the position of reviewing that which it would not do
and reduces arbitrators' willingness to create particularized solutions for fear the
decision will be vacated by a reviewing court." Id. at 936.
74. Id. at 935.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 935-36.
77. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache
Trade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
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expanded review issue. 7 9 In that concurrence, Judge Kozinski noted
his apprehension in allowing expanded review, due to a lack of direct
Supreme Court or Congressional approval of parties' ability to direct
courts as to what standard to apply. Nonetheless, Judge Kozinski ul-
timately decided that the court should enforce an arbitration agree-
ment by its terms, due to the "strong policy of party empowerment
embodied in the [FAA] ... ."80 He found support for his decision in the
fact that the review the parties contracted for-review for errors of
law and fact-would create work no different than the work district
courts perform on "appeals from administrative agencies and bank-
ruptcy courts, or on habeas corpus."8' He then quipped, "I would call
the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge
would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a
dead fowl."8 2
In Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services,8 3 the Ninth
Circuit abruptly reversed Lapine, holding that the FAA provides the
exclusive standards of review for arbitration decisions and that par-
ties therefore should not be able to compel the enforcement of their
contractually chosen standards.8 4 In support of its reversal, the court
first suggested that allowing expanded review could potentially elimi-
nate the benefits of arbitration; arbitration would simply serve as a
prologue to litigation.8 5 Next, the court acknowledged that Volt and
Mastrobuono provide parties free reign in modifying their rules and
procedure for their arbitration process, but determined that once the
case reaches federal court, the arbitration process is over, and the lati-
tude provided by the Supreme Court has "no bearing whatsoever on
[parties'] inability to amend the statutorily prescribed standards gov-
79. See, e.g., Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 169-70.
80. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Kozinski explained further, "I
see no reason why Congress would object to enforcement of this agreement. This
is not quite an express congressional authorization but, given the [FAA's] policy,
it's probably enough." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. "Reading" the intestines of dead animals for divinatory meaning is a wide-
spread practice in East Africa. One anthropologist explained the underlying pro-
cess like this: "[W]hile there is a set of rules underlying the discourse of entrail-
reading, it is the body of tacit, social, contextual clues which sets the bounds of
'meaning' of the message in the entrails-details of the physical structure of the
intestines have no determinate meaning in themselves." J. Abbink, Reading the
Entrails: Analysis of an African Divination Discourse, 28 MAN 705, 705 (1993).
83. 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. Id. at 994.
85. Id. at 998 ("Arbitration is a dispute resolution process designed... to respond to
the wishes of the parties more flexibly and expeditiously than the federal courts'
uniform rules of procedure allow .... Broad judicial review of arbitration deci-
sions could well jeopardize the very benefits of arbitration, rendering informal




erning federal court review."8 6 The court, however, seemed to ground
its decision primarily on the FAA itself, suggesting that Section 10
contains the exclusive grounds for review of arbitration decisions. The
fact that parties have freedom to personalize arbitration rules and
procedures has no effect on their inability to change "statutorily pre-
scribed standards governing federal court review."8 7 The court con-
cluded that because Congress has explicitly prescribed exclusive
standards of review, parties cannot contract to expand them.
88
Although not expressly deciding the issue, Judge Posner's dicta in
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.8 9
strongly demonstrates the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's negative
disposition toward allowing expanded judicial review. The case in-
volved interpretation of a section of the Taft-Hartley Act, but the
court, looking to the FAA, opined, "[Parties] can contract for an appel-
late arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award. But they can-
not contract for judicial review of that award; federal jurisdiction
cannot be created by contract."90 Posner advocated a "severely lim-
ited" role in reviewing an arbitrator's decision and that it would be a
"serious practical mistake... to subject the reasoning in arbitrators'
opinions to beady-eyed scrutiny."9 1
3. The Eighth Circuit and Schocl" Undecided
The Eighth Circuit has been presented with the expanded review
issue'twice, first in UHC Management, and most recently in Schoch.
Although not deciding the issue definitively, the court has expressed
serious doubt about allowing expanded review.
In UHC Management, the court first expressed its doubtfulness
about expanded review, stating, "We do not believe it is yet a foregone
conclusion that parties may effectively agree to compel a federal court
86. Id. at 1000.
87. Id.
88. Id. Earlier, discussing the "exclusive" statutory grounds provided in the FAA,
the court stated that they could find that arbitrators had "exceed[ed] their pow-
ers" under 10(a)(4), "when the award is 'completely irrational' ... or exhibits a
'manifest disregard of law' .... " Id. at 997 (quoting French v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) and Todd Ship-
yards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1991)
respectively).
89. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1505. As an alternative, Posner suggested that parties could instead con-
tract for review from an appellate arbitration panel. Id. Although not discussing
this creation of jurisdiction argument, the court in Kyocera cited (with approval)
the same excerpt cited in the text, suggesting that it adopted the same rationale.
Kyocera Corp v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs. 341 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2003).
91. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 935 F.2d at 1506 (suggesting that such
"beady-eyed scrutiny" might "discourage [arbitrators] from writing opinions at
all," which are a good thing, because "writing disciplines thought").
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to cast aside sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA."92 This case arose over
a subcontracting agreement between UHC and Computer Science Cor-
poration that contained an arbitration provision which stated that the
arbitrators should be "'bound by controlling law."' 93 Computer Sci-
ences contended this signified an agreement for expanded judicial re-
view. 94 On appeal, the court was not forced to decide whether it would
ultimately allow expanded review because the court found that even if
it were to recognize expanded review, the aforementioned language
did not "clearly and unmistakably" express the parties' intent to adopt
such standards.95 Showing its distaste for expanded review, the court
concluded that instead of contracting for expanded review, the parties
"agreed to arbitration that would be 'binding,' rather than merely con-
stituting a trial run of their claims precedent to a merits disposition in
federal court."96
4. Schoch v. InfoUSA
In March 2000, Schoch, a former infoUSA employee, filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska against infoUSA
for breach of contract, reformation, and unjust enrichment. 97 The suit
stemmed from infoUSA's refusal to allow Schoch to exercise an option
to purchase infoUSA stock pursuant to an agreement infoUSA
claimed was expired. The parties agreed to submit the claim to arbi-
tration, and the district court stayed the pending suit. A retired state
trial judge arbitrated the dispute and, after three days of hearings and
post-hearing briefs, found for Schoch. In his nine-page opinion, the
arbitrator held that the stock option had not expired when Schoch at-
tempted to exercise it and accordingly awarded Schoch $1,632,000 in
damages.98
Following the decision, pursuant to Section 9 of the FAA, Schoch
moved to have the district court confirm the award, and infoUSA
moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitration agreement
called for an expanded standard of review.99 InfoUSA specifically
pointed to the language near the end of the arbitration agreement,
which required the arbitrated matter to be "'resolved in accordance
with applicable law."'10 0 The district court refused to apply an ex-
92. UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998).
93. Id. (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 998.
96. Id.
97. Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2003).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 788 (quoting the parties' arbitration agreement). The court cited more of
the arbitration agreement: "'The Arbitrator shall issue an award consisting of
findings of fact and conclusions of law .... The Arbitrator's decision and award
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panded standard of review and confirmed the arbitrator's award. In-
foUSA appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Addressing the expanded review question on appeal, the Eighth
Circuit began by acknowledging the narrow statutory grounds for re-
view and the two judicially created standards recognized by the Cir-
cuit.1 0 ' In regard to the propriety of expanded review, the court
renewed its "grave skepticism" expressed five years earlier in UHC
Management, stating: "It is not clear, however, that parties have any
say in how a federal court will review an arbitration award when Con-
gress has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a
review is to occur [under the FAA].'"102 The court cited other reasons
for its skepticism as well, suggesting that allowing expanded review
would effectively amend the FAA, fundamentally alter arbitration,
and change the nature ofjudicial review. 10 3 The court also stated that
when arbitration is involved, courts "'are not equipped to provide the
same judicial review given to structured judgments defined by proce-
dural rules and legal principles."'104
Despite its skepticism, the court chose not to expressly decide the
issue, instead suggesting that (assuming expanded review was al-
lowed) if parties want an expanded standard of review, this intent
must be "clearly and unmistakably expressed"-a standard it found
the language in the arbitration provision at issue did not meet.105
III. ANALYSIS
Contrary to the inclinations expressed in Schoch, the overriding
goals of the FAA-as interpreted and repeatedly explained by the Su-
preme Court-dictate the enforcement of arbitration clauses that pro-
vide for expanded judicial review.
shall be valid and binding, judgment may be entered on such award, and such
award shall be final as to the Parties, as long as the Arbitrator has not exceeded
his or her authority (i.e., the award would be limited to disputes arising out of the
[Complaint] ... and resolved in accordance with applicable law).'" Id. at 787-88
(quoting the parties' arbitration agreement).
101. See supra text accompanying note 34.
102. Schoch, 341 F.3d at 789 (quoting UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp,
148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998)). The court continued, "'Congress did not au-
thorize de novo review of [an arbitration] award on its merits; it commanded that
when the [statutory] exceptions do not apply, a federal court has no choice but to
confirm.'" Id. (quoting UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997).
103. Id. at 789 n.3 (expressing its skepticism about expanded review, "which would
seemingly amend the FAA, crown arbitrators mini-district courts, force federal
trial courts to sit as appellate courts, and completely transform the nature of
arbitration and judicial review") (citing Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458,
462 (8th Cir. 2001)).
104. Id. (quoting Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 462).
105. Id. at 789.
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A. Freedom to Contract Prevails
1. Enforcement by Terms Trumps Concerns of Efficiency
The importance of enforcing an arbitration agreement according to
its terms should override a court's concerns about the effect of ex-
panded review on the efficiency of the arbitration process. Speed and
efficiency have long been a recognized benefit of the arbitration pro-
cess, and even commentators who support expanded review concede
that it could operate to slow down the arbitral process. 10 6 However,
as expressly stated in Dean Witter, the overall goal of the FAA is not to
"promote the expeditious resolution of claims," but instead to "ensure
judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate."10
7
Given the similarities between the bifurcation issue in Dean Witter
and the expanded review question, the Court's rationale in deciding
that case is instructive in examining the expanded review issue. Dean
Witter involved enforcement of arbitration agreements that resulted
in bifurcation, which, like expanded review, could operate to slow
down the arbitration process. In addition, the Dean Witter Court ac-
knowledged that bifurcation was not contemplated by the drafters of
the FAA, 108 just as the drafters undoubtedly did not contemplate par-
ties' wanting to contract for expanded judicial review.1o 9 Because the
FAA's drafters did not explicitly consider the possibility of bifurcated
proceedings when formulating the FAA, the Dean Witter Court looked
to the overall legislative purpose, which it determined to be to ensure
the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms.
The same rationale should apply when parties contract for expanded
review. The overriding purpose of the FAA to enforce arbitration
agreements by their terms dictates that expanded review provisions
should be enforced-even if it is at the expense of some efficiency. 1 1o
106. Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 192.
107. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). See discussion,
supra Part II.A.2. But see also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing Congress's intent to limit judi-
cial review, stating arbitration is meant "to respond to the wishes of the parties
more flexibly and expeditiously than the federal courts' uniform rules of proce-
dure allow"); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001)
(allowing expanded judicial review would "further sacrific[e] the simplicity, expe-
diency, and cost-effectiveness of arbitration. Rather than providing a single in-
stance of dispute resolution with limited review, arbitration would become yet
another step on the ladder of litigation.").
108. See supra Part II.A.2.
109. See infra note 124.
110. Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 183-84 (2003) (concluding that when parties express their




2. Changing Arbitration Process Does Not Endanger
Enforceability
Similar to concerns about adverse effects on arbitral efficiency, the
Schoch court suggested that allowing expanded review could trans-
form arbitration panels into "mini-district courts," completely chang-
ing the arbitration process."' Other courts have evinced similar
concerns, suggesting that expanded review would eliminate the very
benefits of arbitration by endangering its independence and lessening
arbitrators' willingness to provide creative remedies, thus blurring the
line between arbitration and adjudication. 112 While concerns like
these have been the subjects of rigorous debate among alternative dis-
pute resolution professionals, 11 3 they should not be of major import to
the courts, which are bound to enforce arbitration agreements accord-
ing to their terms, even if they provide for a different arbitration pro-
cedure than that specified in the FAA.114 As demonstrated in Volt,
the FAA does not favor arbitration under a particular set of proce-
dures, nor does the FAA operate to coerce parties to arbitrate in an
established manner. 1 15 This same rationale suggests that FAA poli-
cies would not be offended by allowing expanded judicial review be-
yond what is specified in the statute."
16
In practice, parties will choose arbitration with or without ex-
panded review only after weighing the benefits and drawbacks associ-
111. Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
112. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936. See also Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998 (stating that broad
judicial review might "jeopardize the very benefits of arbitration, rendering infor-
mal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming ju-
dicial review process").
113. Compare Eric van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded
Judicial Review: Arbitral Appeal Vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 157, 218
(2003) (ability to choose arbitral appeal (i.e. expanded review) will "safeguard the
integrity of the arbitral process" and give parties the optimum ability to craft an
arbitration process to fit their relationship) and Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at
192 (arguing that the option for expanded review would make arbitration appeal-
ing to a wider range of parties) with Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Re-
volving Door of Justice: Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an
Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 861, 915 (2004) (concluding that the Su-
preme Court should halt the erosion that expanded review causes to the FAA's
policy of favoring arbitration or else arbitration will lose its "ability to resolve
disputes promptly, and promise to deliver final and binding resolutions") and Di
Jiang Schuerger, Note, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?, 4 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 251-52 (1999) (suggesting that allowance of expanded re-
view would reduce public confidence in arbitration and reduce arbitration to a
primary step before litigation).
114. See supra Part II.A.2.
115. Volt Info. Scis., Inc v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) ("Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not
coercion . . . ."), See supra text accompanying note 19.
116. Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 185.
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ated with it.117 Further, although the impact of expanded review on
the functioning and dynamics of arbitration raises valid concerns in
any particular case, these concerns should be considered by the par-
ties to the contract-not the courts. This is not to suggest that ex-
panded review cannot be beneficial; on the contrary, there are many
reasons why parties would choose expanded review. Three of the most
commonly cited benefits of allowing expanded review are: it estab-
lishes an attractive middle ground for parties who desire arbitration
but also highly value "reasoned and correct decision over instant jus-
tice;"118 it gives added security in choosing arbitration in complex
cases or when there are substantial assets at stake; 1 9 and it provides
protection from "maverick arbitrators" who are less likely to award
aberrant awards when faced with expanded review. 120 In sum, there
are valid reasons to support a decision for expanded review, and when
parties do opt for expanded review, courts are bound to honor the
terms of the arbitration contract just as they would other language in
contracts.
B. Balancing FAA Concerns: The Clear and Unmistakable
Intent Requirement
Although side-stepping the larger issue of deciding definitively
whether it would allow expanded judicial review, the Schoch court
made it clear that if it were to allow expanded review, it would require
parties to include in their arbitration clauses "clear and unmistaka-
ble" language establishing expanded review. 1 21 This standard would
be appropriate and sufficiently stringent to preserve the underlying
FAA policy of avoiding uninvited judicial intervention while still hon-
oring the mutual intent of the parties.1
22
Undisputedly, a goal of the FAA is to ensure that courts cannot
unduly interject their own judgments to supplant the reasoning of ar-
bitrators. However, courts that have disallowed expanded review fail
to recognize the differing considerations between: (1) a situation
where parties are desirous of increased court participation and (2)
other situations where the court's interference is unwanted (or unwar-
ranted). Thus, these courts incorrectly construe the policy of prevent-
ing undue court intervention as applicable to both situations. Bowen
117. Id. at 192. See also Di Jiang Schuerger, supra note 113, at 246 ("[Flinality of an
arbitral award may be either a benefit or drawback of arbitration, depending on
the parties' interests. Some parties may appreciate a fast and final decision,
while others would rather have the assurance that any possible legal or factual
mistakes can be brought to a court for correction.").
118. Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 192.
119. Van Ginkel, supra note 113, at 194.
120. Younger, supra note 25, at 262.
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. See Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 181.
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is a prime example. There, the court failed to appreciate the differing
dynamic when judicial review is invited rather than unduly imposed,
suggesting any expanded review would undermine the FAA's policies
of "judicial respect for the arbitration process."123 On the contrary,
when parties clearly and unmistakably choose to allow judicial review,
there is no improper court interference-the parties have chosen to
have a court review their award and perhaps disallow it for noncon-
formity to their chosen standard. 124
Courts that have allowed expanded review have noted the impor-
tant consideration of avoiding uninvited court interference, but have
uniformly compensated by choosing a high enough standard so as to
both prevent uninvited interference and allow the enforcement of the
agreement by its terms. 125 Applying standards similar to the "clear
and unmistakable" standard proposed in Schoch, these courts have re-
fused, for example, to acknowledge expanded judicial review based on
the mere existence of a choice-of-law clause where the preferred state
law allows expanded review.12 6
The three reasons presented in Roadway in determining that a ge-
neric choice-of-law clause did not in itself suffice as an agreement for
expanded review 127 further demonstrate the workability of imple-
menting a stringent standard before finding that parties contracted
for expanded review. First, a high standard would reduce the chance
123. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he contract
clause in this case threatens to undermine the policies behind the FAA. We
would reach an illogical result if we concluded that the FAA's policy of ensuring
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements is well served by allowing for ex-
pansive judicial review after the matter is arbitrated.").
124. Maggio and Bales write:
Certainly in the hostile judicial atmosphere of 1925 the 68th Congress
could not foresee that a time would come where contracting parties
would desire judicial review of their award on the merits. Therefore, the
FAA did not anticipate or address the situation where parties agree that
judicial review of the award would proceed under standards other than
those provided in the Act. The language anticipates and prevents judi-
cial interference but does not preclude judicial review by invitation or
contract.
Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 181-82 (footnote omitted).
125. P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (pre-
sumption that FAA standards apply can be replaced only with explicitly "clear
contractual language"); Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d
337, 341 (5th Cir. 2004) (requiring "clear and unambiguous contractual lan-
guage" to opt out of FAA rules, which could be satisfied when "a contract ex-
pressly references state arbitration law, or if [the] arbitration clause specifies
with certain exactitude how the FAA rules are to be modified") Roadway Package
Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 294 (3d Cir. 2001) (must "clearly evidence an
intent to opt out"). See supra Part II.C.1.
126. See Action Indus., 358 F.3d at 341-43 (finding a generic choice of law clause in-
sufficient in supplanting statutory standards); text supra accompanying notes
50-54.
127. See supra Part II.C.1.
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that courts will determine that parties have opted out of the FAA
standards when they did not intend to do so. 128 Next, it would assist
in establishing a rule that arbitrators and judges could both easily ap-
ply. 12 9 Finally, it would create a rule that sophisticated parties could
still negotiate around without additional expense.1 30 As the Roadway
rationale demonstrates, the "clear and unmistakable" standard
strikes a balance. It protects against undue court interference by
thwarting a court from reading expanded review into a contract where
it was not contemplated, but it allows sophisticated parties to negoti-
ate and choose expanded review. The "clear and unmistakable" stan-
dard thus preserves both FAA concerns: avoidance of undue court
interference and enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms.
C. Overcoming Concerns with Expanded Review
1. Practical Safeguards in Implementing Expanded Review
The importance of enforcing arbitration agreements by their terms
is a potent argument in favor of expanded review, but it is not all en-
compassing. One of the most forceful arguments forwarded against
expanded review is that parties cannot interfere with judicial indepen-
dence by requiring the court to apply standards chosen by private par-
ties, as requiring the application of such varying standards would
require a court to review unfamiliar proceedings in a manner that it is
ill-equipped to carry out.' 3 1 Although proponents of contractual ex-
panded review can point to no explicit statutory language firmly es-
tablishing the ability to contract for expanded review, practical
considerations weigh in their favor. The established functions of a
court create practical limitations that parties must consider when
structuring their arbitration agreement and determining their desired
grounds for judicial review. First, when parties choose to establish
expanded review, they inevitably contract for grounds that are reason-
128. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 296 (3d Cir. 2001) (conceding that any default rule will
lead to some inaccuracies, but concluding, in light of the historical hostility to-
ward arbitration, that it would be better to wrongly conclude a party did not opt
out than the other way around).
129. Id. The court suggests that it would be easy to apply in that the analysis would
essentially be over once it was concluded that the contract contained nothing
more than a generic choice-of-law clause. This is significant because to hold oth-
erwise would require courts to examine the substantive law of the chosen juris-
diction to determine whether or not it allows or requires expanded review. This
could cause considerable confusion and increase the chances of finding that par-
ties who never contemplated expanded review will be found to have "opted out" of
the statutorily prescribed standards. Id. at 297.
130. Id. at 296-97.
131. See supra Part II.C.2.
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able and that can be readily applied by the judiciary.132 Thus far, no
party has asked a court to review an arbitrator's award by foreign
standards like "flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead
fowl," 1 3 3 sticking instead to familiar standards-review for errors of
law or fact. 134 Second, in an effort to provide the district court with
substance to review, parties desirous of expanded review must struc-
ture their arbitration agreement accordingly; this most likely means
requiring a written opinion and, perhaps, a transcript of the proceed-
ing.13 5 Providing a written opinion ensures that the court can conduct
its review based on a record it is comfortable and familiar with. In the
event that parties unwisely fail to contract for a written opinion yet
seek expanded review, a court would be justified in denying a motion
to vacate because the party seeking to vacate the arbitral award
would have failed to meet its necessary burden for establishing the
agreed upon grounds for review. 13 6
Assuming parties select reasonable grounds for review and other-
wise structure their arbitration agreements to facilitate expanded re-
view, conducting such review would not require courts to do
unfamiliar work, nor would it create an unjustifiable burden. These
practical considerations should suffice to assuage the notion expressed
in Schoch that courts are not equipped to provide similar review to
arbitrators' decisions as they do for other "'structured judgments de-
fined by procedural rules and legal principles.'"'137 As pointed out by
Judge Kozinski in his Lapine concurrence, reviewing an arbitration
decision for errors of law or fact is "no different from [the review] per-
formed by the district courts in appeals from administrative agencies
132. See Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 188-89.
133. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinksi,
J., concurring) overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003). See also supra note 82.
134. As to the potential of parties choosing an asinine standard like "studying the
entrails of a dead fowl", Professor Goldman makes clear that a court could refuse
to enforce it. He stated further, "Given the unlikelihood that parties would
choose such an arbitrary standard, case by case review is sufficient." Goldman,
supra note 110, at 186. On the issue, Maggio and Bales write, "[W]here parties
involve the judiciary, respect for tradition and the institution itself are important
considerations.... Thus, like so much else in the law, parties are free to agree for
expanded review within reason .... [f they choose to involve the courts in the
confirmation and review of the arbitration award, the standards they choose for
that review must be reasonable and applicable within the traditional structure of
the judiciary." Maggio & Bales, supra note 9, at 188-89. Cf Blankley, supra note
22, at 425 ("[Tjhe day will soon come when the parties ask the court to review
their award under an unfamiliar standard.").
135. Blankley, supra note 22, at 409.
136. Goldman, supra note 110, at 187.
137. Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hoffman
v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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and bankruptcy courts, or on habeas corpus."138 Despite disallowing
expanded review, the court in Bowen conceded that reviewing an arbi-
tration award is less work than hearing an entire case, and-even
with expanded review-arbitration would still help lighten the load of
the district courts.13 9 Given these practical realities, it is unrealistic
to assume that a private contract will dictate how a court will conduct
its business. Interestingly, at least one commentator suggests that
such unrealistic sentiments helped to spur Congress to adopt the FAA
in the first place.
140
2. Permissibility of Additional Grounds of Review
Schoch's questioning of the ability of parties to contract for ex-
panded review when Congress has set forth "a specific self-limiting
procedure" for such review is undercut by the court's own recognition
of two additional judicially created grounds for review. 14 1 Indeed, the
judicial creation and acknowledgment of additional, albeit narrow,
grounds for review puts to rest the idea that Section 10 of the FAA
provides the exclusive grounds for review of an arbitral award. 14 2 The
courts in Bowen, Kyocera, and Schoch all failed to recognize the incon-
sistency of stressing the exclusivity of the FAA standards while ac-
knowledging judicially created grounds of review. 14 3 Concededly, any
of the recognized judicial standards are much narrower than review
for errors of law or fact that may be contracted for by parties. None-
theless, the mere recognition of any extra-statutory grounds at all un-
dermines the argument that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds
138. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinksi, J., concurring).
139. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001).
140. Moses, supra note 37, at 444.
141. See supra Part II.C.3. The fact that the judicially created standards adopted by
the Eighth Circuit, are in the court's words, 'extremely narrow," especially com-
pared to a de novo or other more intensive standard for which parties could con-
tract, is of no consequence for the purposes of this argument; their mere
acknowledgement suggests a belief that the statute did not necessarily create the
exclusive means for review. See infra note 143.
142. See supra Part II.B.2.
143. See supra Part II.B.2, II.C.2. Interestingly, in discussing permissible grounds for
review, the Kyocera court mentioned the "completely irrational" and "manifest
disregard" standards as if they were a subset of FAA 10(a)(4) ("where the arbitra-
tors exceeds their powers") and actually statutory grounds. See supra note 88.
This seems contradictory to previous treatment by the circuit, as well as contrary
to most case law and commentators who treat the aforementioned standards as
judicially created. Erik Van Ginkel, "Expanded" Judicial Review Revisited" Ky-
ocera Overturns Lapine, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 47, 52-53 (2003). See Lapine
Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (mentioning "com-
pletely irrational" and "manifest disregard" standards disjunctively with statu-
tory grounds), overruled by Kyocera Corp v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
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for review. 14 4 Perhaps more importantly, if the court were to apply its
own judicially created standard rather than grounds chosen by the
parties, it would effectively assert its own prerogative rather than
honoring the intent of the parties, thus violating a fundamental prin-
ciple of the FAA to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements ac-
cording to their terms. The court in Gateway correctly recognized this
inconsistency, reversing a district court that chose to apply its judi-
cially crafted "harmless error standard" rather than the "errors of
law" standard chosen by the parties. 14 5 To apply grounds of review
different than what is agreed upon by the parties would frustrate
those parties' mutual intent and offend the federal arbitration policy
requiring a court to "conduct its review according to the terms of the
arbitration contract."146
If FAA Section 10 is not the exclusive ground for reviewing an arbi-
trator's award, which-as evinced by the widespread acknowledge-
ment of judicially created exceptions-has been at least implicitly
concluded by the vast majority of courts, then the overriding purpose
of the FAA to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements according
to their terms dictates that parties should be able to choose their own
grounds for review. Allowing parties to opt for different grounds of
review would be consistent with the Supreme Court's stance that the
rules provided in the FAA can give way when parties choose different
ways of effectuating the arbitral process.
14 7
3. Expanded Review Does Not Create Jurisdiction by Contract
The argument forwarded in Chicago Typographical Union No.
16148 that allowing expanded review would create jurisdiction by con-
tract is misplaced, and it is the least compelling argument against al-
lowing expanded review. Section 4 of the FAA requires an order
compelling arbitration only when the federal court would otherwise
have jurisdiction over the case.149 Therefore, although the FAA cre-
ates substantive law that acts to ensure enforcement of arbitration
agreements, it does not in and of itself create jurisdiction. The Su-
preme Court summed up the unique stature of the FAA, explaining:
[T]he [FAA] is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdic-
tion. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating
the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any inde-
144. See Moses, supra note 37, at 442-43 (discussing contradiction of Ninth and Tenth
Circuits position that FAA standards were exclusive while recognizing judicially
created standards).
145. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
146. Id.
147. See supra Part II.A.2.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
149. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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pendent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331 or other-
wise .... [Tihere must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent
basis for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue.
1 5 0
Given the FAA requirement for an independent basis for federal juris-
diction, it is unclear how allowing expanded review could somehow
create jurisdiction. 151
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is a creature of contract. The underlying policies be-
hind the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, dictate the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements by their terms-even if that leads
to the sacrifice of some efficiency or to changes in the structure of the
arbitration process. This policy is applicable to expanded review. The
Eighth Circuit should allow parties to contract for expanded judicial
review when the arbitration clause "clearly and unmistakably" dem-
onstrates the parties' intent for expanded review. Although expres-
sing grave skepticism in Schoch about the validity of expanded
review, the Eighth Circuit has not definitively decided the issue,
and-given the Supreme Court's refusal thus far to grant certiorari to
settle the circuit splitl 5 2 -it could again get the chance to recognize
the ability of a party to have arbitration and expanded review too.
150. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
151. See Blankley, supra note 22, at 426.
152. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Schoch. Schoch v. InfoUSA, 341 F.3d
785 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 (2004). Likewise, the Supreme
Court has not granted certiorari in any other case raising the expanded review
issue. See, e.g., P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21(1st Cir.
2005) cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1785 (2006); Roadway Packages Sys., Inc. v. Kayser,
257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001).
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